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become dependent on U.S. know-how. U.S. export controls are moreover
often difficult to enforce outside the U.S. territory and their utility in this
respect is therefore questionable. Be that as it may, the current U.S. gov-
ernment position will continue to give rise to conflicts with its allies, and
will clearly be to the detriment of U.S. economic and business interests.
In summary, it is submitted that the United States government should as
a matter of principle not attempt to regulate the export activities of foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies, except:
1) when the subsidiary is simply a conduit through which a U.S.-origin
commodity passes on its way to its intended destination in a third
country, or
2) when the subsidiary is deliberately used to circumvent controls over
exports from the United States, or
3) when the subsidiary is manufacturing high technology strategic prod-
ucts based on U.S. technology.
Such regulation, provided it is strictly defense-related, should normally
be understood and accepted by the subsidiaries' host governments. U.S.
export controls designed to "punish" countries (like Libya) whose activities
may not be to the liking of the U.S. government, or designed to achieve
some essentially domestic political goal (such as the boycott regulations),
will seldom be palatable to foreign governments and should consequently
not be applied to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
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Transferring U.S. Technology to the
Soviets: Some Practical Legal
Problems
Since 1965 the Soviet leadership has undertaken an intense effort to mod-
ernize its country's economy. One aspect of this modernization program is
importation of technology, patents and know-how from more advanced
countries. By importing technology, rather than finished goods, the Soviets
aim at avoiding duplication of Western research and becoming dependent
on capitalist manufacturers.
At the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.,
for example, Prime Minister Kosygin observed that hundreds of millions of
rubles could be saved annually by altering import priorities from finished
goods and equipment to know-how and patents.' A directive of the Con-
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gress instructed Soviet international trading organizations to "broaden sig-
nificantly" their acquisition of advanced industrial property.2 Moreover,
Soviet trading firms have earnestly implemented this policy. One Soviet
scholar notes that his country purchased five times more licenses of foreign
technology during the Five Year Plan which ended in 1970 than during all
preceding post-war years.3 Now the gross volume of trade in licenses
between all Eastern European and capitalist countries is $500 million
annually. 4
Despite the eagerness of Soviet manufacturing firms and foreign trading
organizations to acquire advanced technology, American companies which
possess patents and know-how have not entered the market in large num-
bers. European purveyors of technology, like European sellers of finished
goods, have developed much closer ties with the Soviets and have consum-
mated deals of considerably greater number and value than American
manufacturers.5
Because the complexity of United States regulations and the obscurity of
Soviet laws and commercial practices may be factors which have inhibited
American businessmen from entering technology transfers with the Soviets,
this article addresses a few of the practical legal problems which may arise
in the process of negotiating a deal with the Soviets and securing adminis-
trative clearance for the deal from American authorities.
I. Transferring Technology Protected by
a U.S. Patent
The vast majority of inventions which are protected by U.S. patents or
for which patent applications have been filed probably require no special
permission for export to the Soviet Union. In most cases the procedures of
the Patent and Trademark Office for granting patents will incidentally
authorize the inventor to apply for any foreign patent which he wishes to
secure. Existing regulations require the Office to make available for inspec-
tion by defense agencies any application "containing subject matter the dis-
closure of which might be detrimental to national security."' 6 If any chief
officer of any defense agency determines that disclosure of the invention
through publication of a patent would be detrimental to national security,
he may request the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to issue an
order requiring the invention to be kept secret. 7 If a secrecy order is in
2M.M. Boguslavskii, Pokupka i Prodazha Litsenzii Y SSSR 1969 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO
I PRAvo 53.3GORODISKII, supra, n. 1, 18.
'S. Simanovsky, Conditions and Prospects for License Exchanges of the CMEA Countries,
1980 FOREIGN TRADE 2; 18.
1M. Seger, Tightening up the High-Tech Trade, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1981.
637 C.F.R. § 5.1(b).
'37 C.F.R. § 5.2.
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effect, no U.S. patent may be issued and the inventor may not apply for
foreign patents.8
The holder of a United States patent which is not subject to a secrecy
order may freely apply for patents abroad.9 Moreover, no export license is
required if the inventor has applied for a U.S. patent and received notice
that the patent has been scheduled for printing and publication or if six
months have elapsed since the inventor filed his application. '0 If the inven-
tor wishes to apply for foreign patents before the six month period has
elapsed, he must request a special license from the commissioner." I Finally,
the holder of a patent or applicant needs no special permission to export his
technology if the information contained in the foreign patent application is
generally available to the public in any form through media such as publi-
cations, trade shows or conferences.' 2 Governmental clearance is not
required in these cases because the Office recognizes that public availability
of technical information, either through publication of a patent or general
availability of the data, would allow any foreign national to circumvent any
screening process for the export of technology.
The holder of a United States patent who wishes to register his invention
in the Soviet Union enjoys the advantage which the Paris Convention
affords to innovators throughout the world. The Convention provides the
inventor with a grace period, allowing him to maintain his priority in the
invention in any signatory country if he applies for a patent there within
one year of the date on which his American application is accepted for
review.' 3 The Convention also requires member countries to guarantee to
the citizens of other signatory countries the same rights which they provide
to their own nationals.14 In fact, however, the American inventor enjoys
significantly greater opportunities for compensation in the U.S.S.R. than
the typical Soviet inventor.
Foreign applicants for Soviet patents fie their applications with the
U.S.S.R. State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. The applicant
must employ the Patent Bureau of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce as
his agent in the transaction. In addition to this formal agent, the applicant
may discover that Soviet enterprises which are potential licensees of the
patent will assist the inventor to collect the necessary supporting documents
and persuade the State Committee to issue the patent. 15
The Soviet government issues special regulations describing the type of
information, drawings and specifications which a foreigner wishing to pat-
137 C.F.R. § 5.11(c).
937 C.F.R. § 5.11.
1037 C.F.R. § 5.19(c)(2) and § 5.1 l(a)(2).
"37 C.F.R. § 5.11.
1237 C.F.R. § 5.19(c)(1).
'
3Convention ofthe Union of Paris, 38 Stat. 1645 § 4(A)(1).
141d., § 2.
'
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ent his invention in the U.S.S.R. must supply.' 6 Soviet regulations, like
American administrative rules, change frequently, however, and publica-
tions in the U.S.S.R. which discuss problems of innovation keep the public
abreast of current guidelines. Regulations presently in effect require the
State Committee to inform the applicant of its decision on the patentability
of his invention within six months after it accepts the application. The laws
of the U.S.S.R. afford the patentee protection from infringement of his pat-
ent, including the right to recover all damages which result from the
infringing conduct. 17
II. Transferring Technology Not Protected by a United States Patent
The Office of Export Administration has structured its regulations in
such a way that all exports of unpatented American technology to the
Soviet Union require some type of license. In many cases, however, the
exporter obtains his license by simply meeting the necessary qualifications
and without the necessity of filing any application or receiving any govern-
ment documents. A license for which the exporter need not apply is called
a "general license."' 8 The general export license is available to a manufac-
turer who wishes to transmit technical information if the know-how is not
"directly and significantly related to design, production or utilization in an
industrial process."' 19 In addition, the U.S. manufacturer may export tech-
nical data to the U.S.S.R. without any governmental permission if the
information is of a type which is customarily part of a bid, offer or quota-
tion.20 Finally, a United States firm which has received government per-
mission to sell equipment or facilities to the Soviets may for a period of one
year transmit technical data which is necessary for the assembly or repair of
the commodity without seeking special permission.2 1 The federal regula-
tions exclude a number of categories of technical data, many of which have
military uses, from the ambit of this general license, however.22
The American manufacturer who wishes to license a Soviet firm to use its
unpatented industrial know-how must ordinarily secure a validated export
license. These manufacturers will employ the U.S. Office of Export Admin-
istration as their liaison with governmental defense agencies, several of
which must concur in giving permission to export any unpatented industrial
technology. In contrast to general export licenses, validated licenses are
"An example of such regulations may be found at 1974 VOPROSY IZOBRETATEL'STVA 5; 22-
64, Ukazanlia po soslavleniiu zaiavki na izobretenie.
17 I.E. MAMIOFA, PATENTOVEDENIE (1976) 72.
's15 C.F.R. § 371.1.
15 C.F.R. § 379.3(b).
2015 C.F.R. § 379.4(b)(2).
2115 C.F.R. § 379.4(b)(1).22For example 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(c).
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issued only after special application and case by case review by the Office. 23
The Office considers the identity of the end user of the technology, the type
of data being exported, the uses of which the know-how may be employed
and the availability abroad of technology of comparable quality. '
United States policy restricts the transmission of many types of technical
information to the U.S.S.R. for national security and foreign policy reasons.
The Commodity Control List, compiled by several defense agencies in col-
laboration and published in the regulations of the Office of Export Admin-
istration, provides a broad sample of the types of technology which the
government wishes to control. 24 On the other hand, Congress has recog-
nized that excessive prohibition of technology transfers may place Ameri-
can businessmen at a competitive disadvantage. Our laws reflect an
awareness that no public purpose is served by prohibiting American busi-
nessmen from selling technology which is generally available elsewhere in
the world market. Congress has instructed the President, for example, to
refrain from controlling exports for foreign policy reasons if he determines
that the commodity in question is available without restriction from sources
outside the United States in significant quantities and in comparable quali-
ty to those produced in the United States.25 Moreover, the Department of
Commerce regulations state that the policy of the administration
is to approve applications or requests to export or reexport such commodities and
technical data to [the U.S.S.R., etc.] when the Department determines on a case-
by-case basis that the commodities or technical data are for civilian use or would
not otherwise make a significant contribution to the military potential of the
country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States. 26
Ill. Dealing with the Soviets
The American manufacturer who hopes to export technology which is
protected by United States and Soviet patents has, without being aware of
it, already advertised his industrial property in the U.S.S.R. Officials of
Soviet governmental ministries, managers of major enterprises and others
in the U.S.S.R. who are professionally concerned with innovation keep
abreast of the latest entries in the patent register. Moreover, recently the
Soviet government has been experimenting with new methods of dissemi-
nating information about inventions to managers who might find particular
developments useful.
If an American manufacturer possesses unpatented know-how which he
believes may be of interest to Soviet industrial managers, he may communi-
2315 C.F.R. § 379.5. The Commerce Department has issued new regulations, effective
December 30, 1981, suspending all processing of validated licenses for export of technology to
the U.S.S.R.
1!5 C.F.R. § 399.
2550 U.S.C. app. § 2404(0.
2615 C.F.R. § 385.2.
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cate directly with them before obtaining an export license so long as he does
not disclose the technical process itself or more information than he would
customarily include in a bid. Soviet trade fairs, industrial publications and
symposia provide other means for informing the interested audience of new
technical developments.
Negotiations with Soviet businessmen always involve representatives of
various sectors of the government. Because the Soviet government has a
monopoly on the country's foreign trade, any purchase the American tech-
nology must be approved by a ministry of the government. In addition,
U.S.S.R. law has given all authority to negotiate international transactions
to a group of specialized foreign trade organizations. Finally, the Soviet
enterprise which will ultimately employ the imported technology will also
be a party to the negotiations. If the object of the transaction is a pure
technology license and no equipment or hardware is involved, the lead
Soviet negotiator will be the Foreign Trade Organization Litsenzintorg. 27
Representatives of governmental ministries and agencies, who will take part
in preliminary negotiations, authorize Litsenzintorg to enter the licensing
agreement. 28 Frequently the agreement will name a particular Soviet man-
ufacturing enterprise as a third party beneficiary of the transaction and
recipient of the purchased know-how. 29
Litsenzintorg has developed standard operating procedures for negotiat-
ing with foreign parties. At different stages in the process, it may propose to
enter a consultation contract, a confidentiality agreement or an option con-
tract as a means of learning the attributes of the western know-how and
determining its utility to the Soviet client.30 During this period the prospec-
tive licensor furnishes the Soviets with the result of laboratory tests, the
types of raw materials and fuels used in the technical process. 31 The Sovi-
ets may expect the licensor to conduct some performance tests using raw
materials from the licensee's locale. 32 Soviet practitioners report that engi-
neers employed by the prospective licensor and licensee will usually visit
one another's facilities at the expense of the licensee. 33 These practitioners
state that foreign engineers visiting the U.S.S.R. for such consultations are
paid 125 percent of their customary salary for the period of their stay, in
addition to an allowance for "reasonable maintenance."
After the parties have decided to negotiate a licensing contract, their
attention turns to such matters as field of use restrictions on the acquired
27V.A. RIAZENTSEV, Patentovedenie (1976) 202. The charter of the All-Union Combine Lit-
senzintorg is published at 1979 FOREIGN TRADE 10; 53.
2 8RIAZENTSEV, supra, n.27, 205.
29GORODISKII, supra, n.1, 186.31L.N. Abramova, Ob Opytepodgoovki i zakliucheniia litsenzionykh sdelok, 1980 VoPRosY
IZOBRETATEL'STVA 6, 39; 41.
31M.
3Id., 42.
3I.D. IVANOV AND Iu. A. SERGEEV, PATENTY I LITSENZII V MEZHDUNARODNYKH
OTNOSHENIAKH (1966) 98.
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technology, grant-back and improvements sharing clauses, methods of com-
pensation for the licensor, terms for defending any patents which are
included in the proposed transaction, etc. The U.S.S.R.'s comments on the
United Nations' proposed International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology provide some indication of the government's policy on these
issues.34 The comments reveal that the Soviets favor broad cooperation
between the parties during the term of the agreement and minimal restric-
tions on the licensee's use of acquired unpatented technology after the expi-
ration of the contract. Moreover, as a developing country which is anxious
to avoid dependence on more advanced foreign economies, the Soviets con-
sider as very important the right to manufacture component parts of any
licensed technique on their home soil. As one Soviet practitioner observes,
contract clauses requiring the licensee to purchase parts and raw materials
from the licensor "are fraught with the danger of dependency" and should
be avoided. 35
Frequently Soviet firms acquire advanced technology in order to produce
goods for export to the West.36 Acquisition of technology is often a stage of
the U.S.S.R.'s program for securing foreign exchange. Where the Soviets
plan to export goods produced under the licensed process, clauses in the
agreement which affect international competition between the licensor and
licensee become important. The official policy of the U.S.S.R. opposes ter-
ritorial or quantitative restrictions on the licensee's international market.3
7
The Soviets also frown upon provisions which fix minimum prices for the
sale of the licensed commodity. 38 They may bargain for rights to sell the
article in all countries where the licensor does not hold a patent.
The Soviets will also be very interested in securing a commitment from
the American licensor to share any improvements in the licensed technol-
ogy.39 They will not necessarily expect to receive such information without
charge, however. One Soviet specialist observes that the licensee will be
intensely interested in acquiring all of the licensor's innovations in the tech-
nology during the term of the agreement.40 The parties may also bargain
for a mutual obligation to share improvements without cost.41 A leading
authority on international licensing states that, from the Soviet standpoint,
the entire duration of the license is ideally a period of "continual scientific-
technical cooperation. 42
34U.N. Doc, TD/B/C.6/AC.1/3 (1975).
3 5GORODISKII, supra n.1, 77.36Id., 59.
"Supra, n.34, 4.2.20.38 1d.
3 Id., 5.1.7.
E. VOLYNETS-RUSSET, PLANIROVANIE I RASCHET EFFEKTIVNOSTI PRIOBRETENIIA LIT-
SENZII (1973) 19.4 GORODISKII, supra, n. 1, 86.
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If a technical improvement is patentable, the license may permit the
innovating party to obtain the patent. In anticipation of such cases, the
Soviets may bargain for terms in the agreement requiring the party which
obtains the patent to license the other party to use it.43 The Soviets oppose,
however, provisions which require the licensee to grant-back all improve-
ments to the licensor without any reciprocal rights in the licensee to utilize
the innovation.44 Litsenzintorg will probably also negotiate for the right to
continue using all unpatented know-how following the expiration of the
license and to cease payment for the use of patented technology after the
patents expire. 4
5
Soviet procedure for compensating the licensor differs from the standard
international practice of paying royalties. Rather than paying the licensor a
percentage of the value of each unit of the licensed goods which are pro-
duced or sold, they prefer to pay a lump sum price. The U.S.S.R.'s system
of central planning explains this idiosincratic behavior. Because extraordi-
nary expenditures of Soviet firms are centrally controlled, the enterprise
which acquire the imported technology must ordinarily secure either a bank
loan or a sum of money from a government ministry to finance its innova-
tion. The firm may not incur an obligation, such as the payment of royal-
ties, the scope of which is unpredictable at the outset of the transaction,
because it has insufficient control over its own finances. Moreover, Soviet
managers might be reluctant to allow American accountants to audit the
records of their firms, thereby hindering the licensor from enforcing the
terms of the royalty obligation.
Several aspects of the contract may pertain to patent protection for the
licensed technology. If the technology is licensed patent-pending, the
agreement may state that the amount of the licensor's remuneration is
reduced if the application is denied.46 The agreement may also require the
parties to share the costs of defending the patent against claims of infringe-
ment and to protect the patented article or process jointly from those who
might infringe upon it. 47 Sometimes the license specifies that infringement
upon the patent by a third party will be settled outside court by granting the
infringer a license.48 In such a case the agreement will ordinarily allow the
original licensee to diminish the amount of compensation it is paying.
Finally, the license agreement will generally contain a clause specifying
the forum in which any dispute between the parties will be adjudicated.
Some foreign trade contracts to which a Soviet organization is a party pro-
vide for arbitration by the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Mos-
"Boguslavskii, supra, n.2, 60.
"Supra, n.34, 4.2.3.
4Id., 4.2.1; 4.2.2.
'V.S. POZDNIAKOV, EKSPORTNO-IMPORTNYE OPERATSII (1970) 266.47GORODISKII, supra, n.1, 86.
"POZDNIAKOV, supra, n.46, 267.
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COW.4 9 Others require arbitration in the country of the defendant party.
The majority of Soviet technology licenses specify, however, that all dis-
putes will be resolved by arbitration in Stockholm. Ordinarily, the parties
leave the question of choice of law open.
IV. Protection of the Industrial Property of Americans under Soviet Law
An American manufacturer who has licensed the right to use his unpat-
ented know-how may be concerned about the protection which laws of the
U.S.S.R. will afford against publication of trade secrets and misappropria-
tion of confidential know-how. The licensor's capacity to safeguard the
secrecy of unpatented know-how depends in part upon the terms of the
license agreement. Ordinarily, the agreement will refer to Litsenzintorg as
the licensee. Provisions are included, however, which permit Litsenzintorg
to convey the know-how to Soviet manufacturing enterprises. If the con-
tract permits the licensee to share the technology only with an enterprise
identified by name, the licensor has a legal right to prevent other firms from
using the know-how. 50 If, on the other hand, the contract allows Lit-
senzintorg to convey the know-how to "all Soviet enterprises producing the
particular goods," then the licensor has permitted virtually unrestricted use
of his technology. "An unlimited circle of interested enterprises" may use
the technology.5'
The licensor who discovers that his licensee has breached a covenant of
confidentiality may choose one of several courses of action. The licensor
may declare a breach of contract and compel the licensee to return all tech-
nical data.52 He may also recover from the licensee any damages which he
has suffered because of the breach of confidentiality. 53 Inasmuch as there
are no reported judicial decisions dealing with breach of confidentiality,
however, the method of Soviet courts would employ to compute these dam-
ages is not clear.
The Soviet Civil Code also allows the aggrieved licensor to recover dam-
ages from the enterprise which has improperly received the know-how. 54
The only legal precondition to recovery by the licensor is proof that the
third party knew or should have known that the know-how was confiden-
tial. A Soviet commentator on civil practice states that the licensor may
secure return of his improperly acquired property from the third party.
"The defendant is also obligated to turn over income which was or might
have been acquired by him from the use of the property from the moment
he knew or should have known about his improper acquisition or
"'Boguslavskii, supra, n.2, 61.
'POZDNIAKOV, supra, n.46, 256.
51 GORODISKII, supra n. 1, 58.
1W., 67.
"Belov, 1978 Foreign Trade 3; 38, 44 R.S.F.S.F. Civil Code § 444.
"Belov, supra, n.53, 44 R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code § 473.
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conversion. '' 5"
V. Soviet Licensing Law
The American licensor and his Soviet partner may decide that their
agreement will be governed by the laws of the U.S.S.R. in the event a dis-
pute arises. Like other European countries whose commercial law is
embodied in a civil code, Soviet legislation lists various types of contracts,
such as agreements of sale, lease, subcontract and construction, and pro-
vides rules which are specifically applicable to each type of transaction. In
the event the contracting parties neglect to provide for a particular problem,
such as the period for payment, the Soviet judge may then employ an arti-
cle of the civil code to fill the gap in the contract.
The Soviet Civil Code does not include licensing agreements among its
types of contracts, however, and this legislation is not, in general, available
as a gap filler to the judge. As a consequence, "every term of the license
agreement," a leading Soviet commentator notes, "should be clearly and
fully formulated in the text of the contract because in the event of a dispute
between the parties, arbitrazh [Soviet arbitration], in resolving the matter,
will proceed from the terms of the contract and interpret them according to
their own meaning."
56
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there are few Soviet rules of law
regulating disputes which may arise between licensor and licensee. Soviet
commentators have, however, discussed the circumstances under which one
party may seek judicial rescission of the agreement. Either party may ter-
minate performance, commentators agree, if the other party does not fulfill
a material term of the contract. 57 Terms which are material include specific
deadlines and agreements to preserve the confidentiality of know-how.
In some cases a Soviet judge may permit rescission even though the event
which aggrieves one party is not the fault of the other. The U.S. licensor
may be confronted, for example, with a suit for rescission if the patent
which he has licensed to the Soviet firm is declared invalid. If the contract
is a simple patent license and there is no transfer of accompanying know-
how, a Soviet judge may determine that a declaration of invalidity of the
patent makes the contract voidable by the aggrieved party. 58 A commenta-
tor observes that in such cases the patent is the object of the contract. If it is
invalid the contract fails for want of consideration. The court would proba-
bly reach a different result if the patent is transferred with unpatented
know-how or as part of a deal which included both industrial property and
tangible goods.59 If the contract is a simple license of a patent for which the
"Krasavchikov, SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO, VOL. 11 (1973) 379.
16GORODISKII, supra, n.1, 36.
57M.M. Boguslavskii, 1968 Soventskoe Gosudarsivo i Pravo 5; 59. GORODISKII, supra, n.1,
68.
58POZDNIAKOV, supra, n. 46, 258.
"I1d., 257.
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application is pending at the time of negotiations, the court may rule that
the licensee assumed the risk that the invention would be unpatentable if
the authorities subsequently refuse to issue the certificate.
60
These observations on Soviet law of licensing reveal the importance of
careful negotiation of the agreement, with consideration of all contingen-
cies. The Soviets are anxious to develop their business relations with the
West and they realize that they must have a reputation for commercial pro-
bity in order to cultivate the confidence of American firms. They will,
therefore, generally abide strictly by the letter of any agreement which they
enter. The American businessman should not, however, expect largesse
from his Soviet contracting partner or from the U.S.S.R.'s courts if he omits
to bargain for and include in the agreement terms which become critical at
a later stage in the transaction.
The Soviet party will welcome the opportunity to negotiate terms provid-
ing for all exigencies which may arise. Being performance minded, they
will subsequently use the contract as a road map of their rights and obliga-
tions. Indeed, the historical record of the Soviets as reliable trading part-
ners is one of the brightest aspects of any East-West trade transaction.
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